Why Kenya Should Care About the Houthis’ Control of Bab el-Mandeb

Why Kenya Should Care About the Houthis’ Control of Bab el-Mandeb

Mareb Al-Ward

Yemeni journalist and political researcher

For Kenya, the latest developments in Yemen should not be viewed simply as another chapter in a distant Middle Eastern conflict. They are increasingly becoming a security issue for the Horn of Africa.

Kenya lies within a geographic zone connected to maritime traffic moving from Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, making developments along Yemen’s coast directly relevant to the security of Kenyan shipping and trade.

Since the beginning of September, the expansion of the Iran-backed Houthi rebels along Yemen’s western coast and their seizure of Perim Island, which sits in the middle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, have altered the security landscape of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

This development matters to Kenya on two levels. The first is security, particularly the relationship between the Houthis and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab, which Nairobi regards as a national security threat. The second is economic, involving the potential impact of developments around Bab el-Mandeb on trade and energy.

On the security front, the Houthi expansion comes amid an already documented relationship with Al-Shabaab, heightening existing concerns. There is growing evidence of channels of cooperation between the two groups involving weapons, training, technical expertise and logistical support.

The question that should concern Kenyan policymakers is: What happens if this relationship develops further at a time when the Houthis control a much larger area of territory overlooking one of the world’s most important maritime corridors?

This relationship is no longer marginal in the eyes of major powers such as the United States. The 2026 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

The concern has also been reflected in U.S. military assessments. General Michael Langley, the former commander of U.S. Africa Command, warned that Al-Shabaab represents a growing threat because of its cooperation with the Houthis through Yemen, according to a report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

The U.S. Congress has also taken note of this development. During a U.S. Senate hearing, an expert warned that Al-Shabaab obtaining more advanced drones from the Houthis could pose a concern for Kenya, according to a Congressional Research Service report

The Kenya National Counter Terrorism Centre

These assessments did not emerge in a vacuum. They reflect real events. Kenya has experienced some of Al-Shabaab’s deadliest attacks outside Somalia, including the Westgate attack in Nairobi, the Garissa University massacre, and the 2020 attack on U.S. and Kenyan facilities at Manda Bay.

The question, then, is: Why does Bab el-Mandeb change the equation? The answer requires looking back briefly. Until recently, the relationship between the two groups developed across a maritime corridor where the movement of people, weapons and equipment faced complex geographic and operational constraints. But that geography is changing.

Within a matter of days, the Houthis gained a much stronger position along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and around Bab el-Mandeb after defeating internationally recognized Yemeni government forces. This does not mean that Al-Shabaab will necessarily receive more weapons, or that the two groups will form a formal military alliance. But it does change the opportunities available to them.

The new geography under Houthi control gives the group greater space to organize maritime activities, protect supply networks and develop relationships with actors operating on the African side of the Gulf of Aden. Before this geopolitical shift, government forces were able to disrupt maritime supply routes, and a number of weapons shipments were intercepted.

For Al-Shabaab, on the African side of the Gulf of Aden, this development could provide new opportunities to access weapons, technical expertise and knowledge related to maritime operations. The greatest concern may not necessarily be conventional weapons. It may be technology.

According to the 2025 Panel of Experts on Yemen report.

If this cooperation expands, Kenya could eventually face a militant group with greater technological capabilities operating close to its northern coastline and maritime domain. These emerging risks require close monitoring by the relevant security agencies.

But these developments in the Red Sea and around Bab el-Mandeb are not limited to security threats. They also have commercial implications for Kenya.

Mombasa is not located on the Red Sea, but it is closely connected to the maritime system linking the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden with the western Indian Ocean.

Kenyan officials in the shipping and logistics sectors have linked disruptions in the Red Sea to changes in shipping patterns, higher costs and pressure on port operations, according to the Kenya Ports Authority

Recent experience provides the clearest warning. When Houthi attacks forced shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea, vessels were compelled to take longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope. Kenyan businesses faced higher shipping costs, longer transit times and additional pressure on supply chains.

As a result, a continuing or escalating threat around Bab el-Mandeb could affect Kenya even without a single attack on a Kenyan vessel. Insurance premiums and shipping costs could rise, while transit times could increase.

Ultimately, companies importing or exporting through Mombasa could be forced to pass some of these additional costs on to Kenyan consumers.

This issue is particularly important for Kenya because the country imports its petroleum requirements from international markets, while the Port of Mombasa serves as the country’s main maritime gateway for petroleum products.

Beyond these considerations, there is another reason Kenya should pay attention to developments in Yemen: the economic relationship between the two countries, even though it remains modest compared with Kenya’s major trading partners.

According to UN Comtrade data, the value of goods exported by Kenya to Yemen reached approximately $55 million in 2024.

Tea alone accounted for about $42.4 million of that amount. This means Yemen is not merely a security concern for Kenya; it is also a market for Kenyan agricultural products.

For a country seeking to expand its export markets, protect agricultural revenues and diversify its trading relationships, instability in Yemen and the Red Sea has a direct economic dimension.

The bottom line is that Kenya’s national security map does not end at its land border with Somalia. It extends into the Indian Ocean. Strategically, the Indian Ocean begins closer to Yemen than Nairobi might ordinarily assume.

The central question for Kenya is therefore no longer simply: What are the Houthis doing in Yemen? It is: What could the expansion of their control along Yemen’s western coast mean when combined with a documented and growing relationship with an organization that has already demonstrated its ability to target Kenya?